The New Role for Assurance Services in Global Commerce

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I. INTRODUCTION

The problem of organizing complex production has for the most part been analyzed by law and economics scholars in a dichotomous way: production can be accomplished either through a series of market transactions and contracts, or under the guidance and control of a hierarchical governance structure within a firm.¹ A rich and well-developed

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¹ The classics in this literature include Ronald H. Coase, *The Nature of the Firm*, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937) (defining what a firm is in the context of economic theory), and Oliver E. Williamson, *Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications* xi (1975) [hereinafter Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies] (discussing “the organization of economic activity within and between markets and hierarchies”). For much of the last three decades, law and economics scholars have tried to analyze “firms” as little more than “nexuses,” or devices through which a collection of contracts are coordinated, thus treating enforcement through organizational structure and authority as a subset of contract enforcement. But, as Professor Coase pointed out in *The Nature of the Firm*, firms are substitutes for contracts. See Coase, supra, at 390-91. This view is reinforced by courts’ reluctance to get involved in settling disputes between two participants within a firm, whereas courts (or at least a credible threat of legal sanctions) are a standard
literature has emerged in the last few decades analyzing these two modes (as well as some “hybrid” modes), and considering why one mode might be used in some circumstances, and the other in different circumstances. More recently, scholars have explored how globalization seems to be leading to more “outsourcing,” in which activities that were once carried on within a single firm are now being organized by contracts, across multiple firms, perhaps in multiple countries.

Nearly all of the economic literature on choice of organizational form and the “outsourcing” phenomenon, however, assumes the existence of an institutional context in which rule of law is followed, minimum social standards and business norms are established and regulated (or are at least commonly accepted and followed within a given trade), and contracts can be enforced. Given these characteristics of the institutional context, two firms that both operate in the United States or other developed countries, for example, can focus in their contracts with each other on the terms on which the subject of the contract will be carried out, without having to worry much about baseline or “default” terms. If firm A hires firm B to clean its offices and facilities, for example, A will not have to specify that B may not use child labor, may not dump its waste products in the municipal water system, and may not kidnap A’s executives and hold them for ransom in order to get higher pay than the contract provides. Nor will the contract have to specify that either firm A or firm B can call the other into court to settle any future dispute over terms of the contract. Those things are properly taken for granted, because both A and B will be subject to law, regulation, and customary norms operating in their respective enforcement mechanism for contracts between firms or between an individual and a firm. See, e.g., OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 249 (1985) (referring to the range of within-firm actions that courts will not second-guess as the “zone of acceptance”).

2. Some of the foundational literature here includes WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 1 (comparing the structure of economic relationships in markets and hierarchies); and Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 297 (1978) (elaborating on Coase’s theories by “exploring one particular cost of using the market system—the possibility of post-contractual opportunistic behavior”).

3. A variety of terms have been used by economists to refer to the phenomenon of outsourcing, including “vertical specialization,” “intra-product specialization,” and “global production sharing.” For excellent starting points to explore this literature, see Gene M. Grossman & Elhanan Helpman, Outsourcing in a Global Economy, 72 REV. ECON. STUD. 135, 135 (2005) (discussing “the location of subcontracted activity in a general equilibrium model of outsourcing and trade”); Robert C. Feenstra, Integration of Trade and Disintegration of Production in the Global Economy, J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES, Fall 1998, at 31, 32 (discussing “different measures of foreign outsourcing,” globalization, and “the disintegration of the production process . . .”).

4. Some of the international trade literature recognizes that the quality of foreign enforcement of contracts is an important factor in explaining whether a firm relies on international outsourcing to procure specialized inputs. See Barbara J. Spencer, International Outsourcing and Incomplete Contracts (Nat’l. Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11418, 2005) (focusing on the institutional conditions under which a country can attract global firms to enter into outsourcing contracts in that country, rather than focusing on decisions within the firm, as does the law and economics theory of the firm literature that we are describing here), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w11418.pdf.

5. The contract may specify such things as which courts the parties will go to, which law will be applied, and whether the parties may have to submit to arbitration first. Cf. Erin A. O’Hara & Larry E. Ribstein, Corporations and the Market for Law, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2008) (arguing that the corporate law market is best understood as a special application of the general market for law, and that the differences are explained by considerations underlying the enforcement of all choice-of-law contracts), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/5013/papers.cfm?abstract_id=956919. But as long as the parties are willing to accept the default rules, the contract may leave these details out.
countries.

By contrast, firms that organize production through a long chain of suppliers in a global marketplace might have to be concerned about such problems, as well as numerous other problems that arise in the absence of a sophisticated and well-developed legal and regulatory infrastructure. At least three different literatures have touched on these problems: (1) scholarship in law and economics has considered the importance of rule of law and property rights protection generally to economic development;\(^6\) (2) other work has focused on the problem of regulating environmental and social behavior of corporations in the global context;\(^7\) and (3) the theory of the firm literature in law and economics has considered the standard problems of coordination, communication, and incentive structures in the “make or buy” decision.\(^8\) In the latter case, the literature has generally assumed that various parties contract with each other “in the shadow of the law.”\(^9\) There is also a relevant literature on the development, outside the law, of norms, reputational constraints, and arbitration mechanisms that may substitute for law in some

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7. For an introduction to the voluminous corporate responsibility literature, see OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008). Recently, attention has turned more broadly to what one group of scholars has called “global administrative law,” which is the term coined by Professors Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch, Richard B. Stewart, and Jonathan B. Wiener to describe the “rapidly changing pattern of transnational regulation and its administration.” Benedict Kingsbury et al., Foreword, Global Governance as Administration—National and Transnational Approaches to Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 2 (2005). The conceptual construct of global administrative law includes both the development of new, pluralistic legal regimes, including regimes that regulate the social and environmental conditions of production, and also enforcement of these regimes. Moreover, the global administrative law project seeks to evaluate the legitimacy of these new lawmaking regimes according to such fundamental values of democracy as accountability, transparency, consent, and participation of the governed.

8. The literature on whether firms should “make” their own inputs by integrating vertically, or “buy” them on the market, goes back at least to Coase (1937), supra note 1 (considering the question of why a firm would choose to carry out a transaction within the hierarchical governance structure of the firm, rather than transacting in markets). Other important contributions include ALFRED DUPONT CHANDLER, JR., STRATEGY AND STRUCTURE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF THE INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE (1962); Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972) (arguing that transactions within the firm are essentially identical to transactions in markets governed by contracts); WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 1; and Klein et al., supra note 2 (exploring the possibility of post-contractual opportunistic behavior as a cost of using the market system). For an accessible introduction to the economic issues involved in determining the boundary of the firm, see PAUL R. MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT 552–584 (1992).

In this Article we examine the rapid emergence and expansion of a private sector compliance and enforcement infrastructure that we believe may increasingly be providing a substitute for public legal and regulatory infrastructure in global commerce, especially in developing countries where rule of law is weak and court systems are absent or inadequate. This infrastructure is provided by a proliferation of performance codes and standards (some developed in collaborative processes by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and business), and a rapidly growing global army of privately trained and authorized inspectors and certifiers that we call the “third party assurance industry.”

Third party assurance in some form or another has been used to facilitate commerce for centuries. But its growth in very recent years has been phenomenal. Moreover, whereas the third party assurance business first developed to facilitate the making and carrying out of private contracts, we claim that the activities of the assurance industry are rapidly being deployed for purposes that in the past would be considered “public” and “regulatory” in nature, and left to the authority of government. Third party assurance may thus be providing a substitute for both private and public law in a number of situations, and may even be providing a new institutional structure through which private commercial exchange may be regulated for essentially public purposes.

We examine the new prominence of this industry in international commerce and the reasons why it has developed so dramatically in the last decade. We also consider whether the rapid deployment of third party assurance in business is facilitating the transmission of global “rule of law” norms of acceptable business behavior to new parts of the world, or whether, by providing a substitute for law, it is undermining the indigenous development of sophisticated legal systems.

II. THE THIRD PARTY ASSURANCE INDUSTRY AND EVIDENCE OF ITS GROWTH

Perhaps the most familiar type of third party assurance service is the external

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10. See generally Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Codes’s Search for Inmanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1766 (1996) (challenging the premise that courts should seek to discover “immanent business norms” and use them to decide cases); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1992) (concluding that the transaction cost analysis of legally enforceable agreements does not account for preferences for extralegal agreements in the diamond industry); Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation through Rules, Norms and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724 (2001) (examining how the rules, norms, and institutions that constitute the private legal system of the cotton industry create value for transactions); Avner Greif, Reputation and Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 857 (1989) (examining how tenth century traders facilitated complex trade that was characterized by asymmetric information and limited legal contract enforcement); Barak D. Richman, Firms, Courts, and Reputation Mechanisms: Towards a Positive Theory of Private Ordering, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2328 (2004) (giving an overview of contract enforcement by firms, courts, and reputation, and establishing a model for choosing contract enforcement mechanisms).

11. The earliest use of third party assurance services may have been the role played by several “boards of state accountants” in verifying state revenues and expenditures in ancient Athens, 500 to 300 B.C. See George J Costouros, Auditing in the Athenian State of the Golden Age (500-300 B.C.), ACCT. HISTORIAN’S J. 41, 41-50 (1978).

12. See infra Part II for evidence of an explosion in recent years in demand for third party assurance services, and for the development of quantifiable performance metrics by which such services can measure and report on performance by parties to actual and potential contracts.
The auditor, who examines financial statements and the processes by which they were generated, and opines on whether the statements fairly and accurately reflect the underlying economic reality. Independent external auditors have been critical to the development of liquid financial markets in which individuals may invest in market-traded securities issued by businesses with reasonable confidence that the information issuers have provided accurately reflects the condition of the underlying business.

Financial institutions that invest in or insure business ventures have also long made use of other kinds of assurance services, in addition to financial audits. The business of assuring and attesting to non-financial matters began at least 180 years ago, for example, when marine insurance companies in France, Britain, and Italy began hiring inspectors to make sure that ships being hired for international commerce were sea-worthy. Financial institutions, including insurance companies and lending institutions, generally continue to be among the most active users of a variety of third party assurance services.

A. The Impact of ISO

A major contributor to the development of a global assurance service industry has been the widespread adoption since the mid-twentieth century of international standards and technical specifications for a vast array of products and processes under the auspices of the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). Since its founding in 1946, ISO has promulgated thousands of technical standards. ISO also disseminates

13. According to the Global Market Information Database by Euromonitor International (GMID), the size of the U.S. market for accountants’ services grew by 9.6% from 2000 to 2004, measured in the dollar value of sales. EUROMONITOR INT’L, AUDITING, ACCOUNTING AND BOOKKEEPING IN THE USA 1 (2005). Auditing and accounting services was the largest sector, accounting for 59.7% of sales in 2004. Id. The U.K. market grew by 12% from 2000 to 2004. EUROMONITOR INT’L, AUDITING, ACCOUNTING AND BOOKKEEPING IN THE UK 1 (2005). As an indication of the explosion in demand for audit services in developing countries, by contrast, the Chinese market for accountants’ services grew by 304.5% over the years from 1999 to 2003. EUROMONITOR INT’L, AUDITING, ACCOUNTING AND BOOKKEEPING IN CHINA 1 (2005). The market is predicted to expand by 149% to $4,022 million by 2008. Id. Auditing took the largest share in China in 2003, accounting for 66.2%. Id.

14. Bureau Veritas Group was founded in 1828 in Antwerp, Belgium, to inspect and classify ships and provide information to insurance companies. Bureau Veritas Group, http://www.bvqi.com (then follow “History” link under “About Us”) (last visited Nov. 26, 2007). Registro Italiano Navale (RINA) has provided ship classification and certification services since its establishment in 1861. Registro Italiano Navale, http://www.rina.it/index_eng.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2007). Intertek started its maritime survey business in 1885. Intertek, About Intertek-History, http://www.intertek.com/aboutintertek/intertek_history.shtml/?lang=en (last visited Nov. 6, 2007). A number of firms that are currently active in international inspection and assurance services, including RINA, SGS, the TÜVs (Technischer Überwachungsverein), Intertek, and DNV (Det Norske Veritas), had their origins as firms that inspected ships, and/or their cargo, for international trade. See discussion infra Part II.B.

15. Familiar types of third party assurance services used in financial transactions include appraisals, auditing, credit rating, title services, and inspections for hazardous materials such as asbestos or environmental “brownfields.”

16. International Organization for Standardization, About ISO—The ISO System, http://www.iso.org/iso/about/discover-iso_meet-iso.htm (then follow “ISO-ISO in figures”) (last visited Jan. 21, 2008). “ISO,” from the Greek word for “equal,” was adopted as the “standardized” name for the organization whose English name is the International Organization for Standardization. Id. (then follow “ISO’s Name”). ISO is a non-governmental organization whose member institutes are part of the governmental structure of their countries, or whose existence is mandated by their government. Id. (then follow “Discover ISO”). Typically, however, members have their roots in the private sector, having been set up by national partnerships of industry
information about dozens of accreditation bodies that, in turn, accredit hundreds of organizations that are in the business of carrying out various evaluations to determine if products, processes, or management systems are in conformance with the specifications in ISO standards.

In 1987, the ISO embarked on a significant new path when it adopted the “ISO 9000” standards of quality management. These were the first sets of international standards that applied to management systems that firms have in place to meet customer and applicable regulatory requirements, rather than to the characteristics of the products firms produce or to units and methods of measuring those characteristics. Although certification is not a requirement of the ISO quality management standards, many firms have chosen to have their systems independently audited and certified to the standards, and certification rapidly “became a de facto requirement for doing business in Europe and other parts of the world,” as well as being actually required for certain products sold in Europe and the United States.

The ISO 9000 idea of creating standards for management systems has greatly fueled the development of the assurance industry. The organizations that were first qualified to certify ISO 9000 compliance were generally European organizations that were already providing quality inspection services for various products; more recently, accounting and audit firms have been expanding their business services portfolios to add capability to perform ISO 9000 certifications.
Although we have so far not found data tracking the growth in the third party inspection and assurance industry, data collected by ISO show that the number of ISO 9000 certified firms and facilities in the world grew from 27,816 in 48 countries in 1993\(^{23}\) to 670,399 in 154 countries by 2004.\(^{24}\) ISO’s approach to compiling these totals involves surveying the certifying bodies; these numbers represent the total number of firms and sites that the certifying bodies claim to have certified. ISO provides no comparable data on the number of active certifying bodies, but this dramatic expansion in the number of firms and plants that have been certified could only be accomplished if the number of people and firms doing certification work had also grown dramatically.

Once the demand for quality management certification had developed sufficiently to support a private sector infrastructure to certify management systems, it was only a small step for business, government, NGOs, and social activists to look to these same sorts of certifying organizations for assurance that companies are meeting specified criteria for social performance.\(^{25}\) In 1996, the ISO adopted the ISO 14000 series of standards for evaluating environmental management systems.\(^{26}\) By 2004, 90,569 facilities and firms, in 127 countries, had been certified as meeting these standards.\(^{27}\) And ISO is currently developing standards for social responsibility as well, although it asserts that these standards are not intended to be the basis for third party certifications.\(^{28}\)


24. Id. at 10.


During the first years of the twenty-first century, those involved in standards-setting activities clearly recognized a growing need for globally relevant standards and related conformity assessment mechanisms. ‘Market forces’ such as global trade and competition; societal issues such as health, safety and the environment; an enhanced focus on consumer needs and involvement and increasing interaction between public-sector and private-sector interests were significantly impacting standardization and conformity assessment programs. Standards themselves had expanded well beyond documents identifying product specifications to instead focus on performance issues and to also include processes, systems and personnel.


27. See The ISO Survey, supra note 19, at 20.


The guidance standard will be published in 2009 as ISO 26000 and be voluntary to use. It will not include requirements and will thus not be a certification standard.

There is a range of many different opinions as to the right approach ranging from strict legislation.
B. An Overview of Assurance Organizations

In the past ten to 15 years, as numerous corporations, NGOs, and other organizations have developed codes of practice for various industries, firms that have long been in the business of inspecting the quality, weight, and quantity of traded goods—especially those that evaluate and certify conformance with ISO standards—have quickly expanded to offer their services in auditing and certifying that firm operations satisfy other codes of practice. Firms such as SGS, Intertek, DNV (Det Norske Veritas), Bureau Veritas Group, RINA (Registro Italiano Navale), and the TÜVs (Technischer Überwachungsverein) have all been in business as inspectors of goods and ships in international trade since before 1900. They all operate globally and have had a quasi-official status as inspectors for customs officials or government agencies regulating products moving in international markets. All have recently expanded their businesses to conduct audits and inspections to verify compliance with social responsibility standards.29

In addition, dozens of new firms have entered the business as certification bodies, including firms such as Cal Safety Compliance Corp. (CSCC), ALGI, and Hong Kong Quality Assurance Agency (HKQAA). CSCC, for example, is a division of Specialized Technology Resources, Inc. in Los Angeles. It was established in 1991 to provide social responsibility auditing services, initially in the garment sector and now in a broad range of industries, including home furnishings, food and agriculture, cosmetics, toys, and high-

at one end to complete freedom at the other. We are looking for a golden middle way that promotes respect and responsibility based on known reference documents without stifling creativity and development.

Our work will aim to encourage voluntary commitment to social responsibility and will lead to common guidance on concepts, definitions and methods of evaluation.

The need for organizations in both public and private sectors to behave in a socially responsible way is becoming a generalized requirement of society. It is shared by the stakeholder groups that are participating in the WG SR [Working Group on Social Responsibility] to develop ISO 26000: industry, government, labour, consumers, nongovernmental organizations and others, in addition to geographical and gender-based balance.

ISO has chosen SIS, Swedish Standards Institute and ABNT, Brazilian Association of Technical Standards to provide the joint leadership of the ISO [WG SR]. The WG SR has been given the task of drafting an International Standard for social responsibility that will be published in 2009 as ISO 26000.

Id.

29. Bureau Veritas Certification, formerly BVQI, was formed by Bureau Veritas Group in 1988 in response to the demand for the independent certification of ISO 9000 Quality Management Systems, primarily providing management systems certification, product certification, and service certification. Bureau Veritas Group, supra note 14. Det Norske Veritas (DNV), established in 1864, primarily focuses on risk management certification and consulting, in particular for maritime, oil and gas, process, and transportation industries. DNV-About Us, http://www.dnv.com/about_us/index.asp (last visited Nov. 6, 2007). Intertek can be traced to three separate companies in 1885, including Thomas Edison’s Lamp Testing Bureau. Intertek, supra note 14. It initially provided maritime surveying and testing of electrical equipment; it now provides testing services and risk management for a wide range of businesses. Id. Registro Italiano Navale (RINA), a company established in 1861 in Genova, has been providing ship classification and certification services since its establishment. RINA, supra note 14. SGS, originally founded in 1878 in Rouen as a French grain shipment inspection house and later registered in Geneva in 1919, provides inspection services of traded goods, product testing services, and certification services for products, systems, or services. SGS Group, SGS In Brief, www.sgs.com/about_sgs/in_brief.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).
tech products, and has operations in more than 110 countries. Similarly, ALGI, headquartered in Nyack, New York, was founded in 1994 by several former Department of Labor officials to conduct social accountability auditing. TransFair USA was launched in 1998 and began “fair trade” certification of coffee purchased from developing countries in 1999. It has since expanded to certification of other food products. HKQAA was established in 1989 by the Hong Kong government to conduct social compliance audits.

C. The “Professionalization” of the Inspection Industry

The assurance business is itself largely unregulated, and there are no well-established and well-accepted training procedures or professional standards for those who “audit” non-financial performance indicators. Yet, by its nature, the assurance business is a business that is rife with potential for abuse. This is because (as is true for financial audits) inspections and evaluations of systems and operating practices are usually arranged and purchased by a supplier company in order to provide assurance to a purchasing company that the supplier has met contract terms or complied with certain norms and standards. And, as is true in the business of providing financial audits, individual auditors might have incentives to accept payoffs (implicit or explicit) in exchange for a “clean” assurance report. Likewise, the client firms whose facilities are being audited might have incentives to offer such payoffs if it is cheaper for them to make the side payments than to comply with the codes or standards. Indeed, factory owners in developing countries whose developed-country customers ask them to subject themselves to audit frequently complain that the demands for audits are a form of extortion.30

Suppliers of financial auditing services long ago figured out that there are two basic mechanisms for addressing this problem: professionalization of the providers of the service, and investments by the providers in reputations for honesty. Professional accountants are now required to go through formal training and licensing by organizations representing accountants, and they typically organize themselves into large, high-visibility firms with substantial interest in maintaining a reputation for honesty, independence, and competence. Those firms, in turn, have incentives to see to it that their auditors are competent, disciplined, and behave in a professional manner.31

These things are only beginning to happen in the nonfinancial assurance business. Although the leading international firms in the business, such as SGS, Intertek, DNV, Bureau Veritas Certification, RINA, and the TÜVs, mentioned above, have substantial reputational capital at risk, many smaller, newer assurance firms in the business may not yet have established reputations. Moreover, there is only one significant professional organization that offers any standardization and assurance of the assurance professionals

30. See, e.g., Dexter Roberts et al., Secrets, Lies, and Sweatshops, Bus. Wk., Nov. 27, 2006, at 42 (Opening paragraphs tell the story of Tang Yinghong, a manager at a Chinese factory due for inspection for Wal-Mart, who received a phone call from an alleged inspector with an organization calling itself “Shanghai Corporate Responsibility Management & Consulting Co.” The caller said that “for a $5,000 fee, he’d take care of Tang’s Wal-Mart problem. ‘He promised us he could definitely get us a pass for the audit,’ Tang [said].”).

themselves. This is the International Register of Certificated Auditors (IRCA), a U.K. organization based in London that was founded in 1984 as part of a U.K. government initiative to establish and certify quality standards. IRCA certifies auditors of management systems, approves training organizations, certifies auditor training courses, and claims to have certified more than 13,750 auditors in over 120 countries worldwide. Generally, however, there is “very little oversight” of the assurance industry.

III. FACTORS CAUSING A RAPID GROWTH IN DEMAND FOR THIRD PARTY ASSURANCE SERVICES

A number of different factors seem to be at work that, together, are driving the extraordinary growth in demand for assurance services and in the supply of businesses that are offering their services as inspectors and auditors to meet this demand.

A. Growth in International Trade and Outsourcing

Other scholars have written at length about the growth in international commerce in the last few decades, and the extent to which corporations in developed countries now contract with developing country firms for parts manufacturing, assembly, testing, and even sales (e.g., call centers) and record-keeping. When products are made in factories owned by, and under the immediate supervision of managerial employees of a large firm, that firm can directly implement its own quality, timely delivery, labor, and environmental operating norms and standards. When the same firm contracts with a factory owner in Bangladesh, Vietnam, or Costa Rica to make the products, the parties to the contract will probably need to develop alternative mechanisms, other than direct managerial control, to make certain that the products are still made according to the hiring firm’s specifications (as to product characteristics, quality, and processes used). These mechanisms may range from the hiring firm having its own inspectors in the contractor’s plant at all times, to having third party inspectors check the plant’s operations from time to time, to relying solely on inspection of the final product at the time the hiring firm takes possession of it. This last mechanism may be widely used for simple commodity-type products made in uncontroversial ways. But, as we discuss

33. Id.
36. See, e.g., Steve Lohr, Outsourcing Is Climbing Skills Ladder, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2006, at C1 (discussing the fact that more skilled jobs are being outsourced); George S. Geis, Business Outsourcing and the Agency Cost Problem, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955 (2007) (examining outsourcing contracts to see how they address agency problems).
below, such products represent a decreasing share of total trade.

B. The Growing Complexity of Products and Increased Division of Labor Within Supply Chains

More of the products being exchanged between firms in international markets are intermediate products that must meet strict specifications if the products are inputs or components of other products, or are made utilizing controversial processes (e.g., strip mining; farming with patented seeds, fertilizers, or pest control chemicals; or labor-intensive assembly potentially involving sweatshop conditions or child labor). It is common, for example, for products to be designed in one country, components to be purchased from suppliers in other countries, and assembly work to be done in yet another country, all for shipment to markets in a number of other countries.

At each step of the way, the corporations organizing this productive activity need the ability to control for quality, conformance to specifications, timely delivery of intermediate products to final assembly plants, and safety in both the manufacturing and use of the product. Throughout this process, inventories must be managed for cost-efficiency and to provide required levels of customer service. For such products, the purchasing company may have compelling reasons to want to monitor steps in the production process in one way or another.

C. The Need by Global Corporations to Assure That Contractors Can Meet Quality and Delivery Requirements

The surge in demand from global corporations for third party assurance stems from global buyers’ need to be sure that, if they were going to outsource an activity to smaller, less-experienced firms in distant countries, those firms could meet quality standards and timely delivery commitments. That need was the impetus for the development of the ISO

37. See FRAGMENTATION: NEW PRODUCTION PATTERNS IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (Sven W. Arndt & Henryk Kierzkowski eds., 2001) (examining the international division of labor from empirical and theoretical perspectives). For a thoughtful analysis of various controversies involving the processes by which products are made and the implications of those controversies for various bodies of law (such as international trade law; domestic environmental, health, and safety regulations; and constitutional analysis of companies’ statements about how their products are made), see Douglas A. Kysar, Preferences for Processes: The Process/Product Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525 (2004).

38. See Grossman & Helpman, supra note 3, at 135. The authors quote an example from the 1998 Annual Report of the World Trade Organization concerning the production of a particular “American” car:

Thirty per cent of the car’s value goes to Korea for assembly, 17.5% to Japan for components and advanced technology, 7.5% to Germany for design, 4% to Taiwan and Singapore for minor parts, 2.5% to the United Kingdom for advertising and marketing services and 1.5% to Ireland and Barbados for data processing. This means that only 37% of the production value . . . is generated in the United States.

Id. (citing WTO, ANNUAL REPORT 36 (1998)).

9000 standards for assuring that organizations could meet product quality expectations, discussed above. The growth of the third party assurance industry based on ISO standard-setting was further fueled by developments in the regulation of international trade. Efforts in Europe to facilitate intra-European trade by harmonizing regulatory requirements initially emphasized compliance with European technical standards as a necessary condition for selling any goods in Europe. Thus, the standards developed by the European standard-setting agency, the Comite Europeen de Normalization (CEN), were applied to any goods sold in Europe. This led non-European companies to argue that technical and other standards, such as for quality and product safety, should be developed by the international standard-setting process of the ISO, rather than through a European process. That position was persuasive to negotiators developing the GATT 1994/WTO Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, which thus provides that where international standards for technical requirements exist, member states should use those standards as the basis for their own technical requirements. As a consequence, ISO certification became necessary for a growing number of products, and as ISO standards expanded beyond technical specifications to quality and environmental management systems, a “huge industry of auditors, certifiers and accreditation bodies has emerged to serve these expanding certification needs.”

D. The Need by Global Corporations to Assure That Contractors Can Meet Labor, Human Rights, and Environmental Standards

In the last decade, for reasons we discuss below, many global corporations have begun seeking assurance that firms they do business with can meet social and environmental standards, in addition to technical and quality standards. This focus on social and environmental standards is driven partly by pressure on companies by some investors. Certain sectors of the investment community, such as public pension funds and

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40. Since the publication of the original ISO 9000 standards, subsequent updates have been published as ISO 9001, 9002, and so forth.

41. See Roht-Arriaza, supra note 16, at 491-92 (discussing the development of the “new approach” that required firms to meet “essential requirements” for the “product to be sold freely throughout the European Community”).

42. See id. at 492 (discussing companies’ arguments that these rules should be elaborated by ISO rather than CEN).

43. See id. at 494-95 (citing the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, art. 2.4, Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1143, reprinted in H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, at 1428 (1994)).

44. Wood, supra note 21, at 261. Professor Wood includes companies’ interests in demonstrating conformance with various environmental standards, as well as ISO 14001 environmental management systems, as having provided the impetus for the rapid expansion of the “huge industry” of third party certifiers, auditors, and accreditation bodies. Id.

45. One indication of the new attention by business firms to social and environmental performance is the publication in early 2007 of the first edition of the CSR Professional Services Directory, which lists 443 organizations worldwide under 49 different service categories, with contact details and summaries of the services they offer to assist corporations in meeting so-called “corporate social responsibility” (CSR) norms and standards. See ETHICAL PERFORMANCE, CSR PROFESSIONAL SERVICES DIRECTORY 2007 (2007), available at: http://www.ethicalperformance.com/csrdirectory/index.php?PHPSESSID=c78e0151641014186bd7a2fa9d305c49.
self-described “SRI funds” (for “socially responsible investment”) in the European Union, United Kingdom, and United States, and insurance investors in the United Kingdom, are increasingly looking at the social and environmental performance of their portfolio companies and those companies’ trading partners in an attempt to identify risks associated with the portfolio firms as well as their trading partners in the supply chain.  

This development, in turn, is causing corporations in developing countries that may be suppliers to more well-known global corporations to insist that their suppliers, in turn, also meet certain standards. In this way, multinational firms may be drawing more small and local firms in more countries into their orbit. This creates an observable movement toward global standard setting and the associated use of third party assurance firms to certify that standards are being met, even by supplier firms that still operate and sell primarily in their home country. As we discuss at greater length below, we suspect this chain of events is becoming an important mechanism by which developed country business standards and norms are being propagated worldwide.

1. Recognition of the Risks to Global Brands From Problems in the Supply Chains

In the last two decades, global corporations have been more inclined to insist that...
suppliers, as well as their own facilities, meet certain social standards because they recognize that each link in the supply chain potentially exposes the whole operation to risks associated with that link. The experience of companies in the chemical industry (beginning with companies in Canada) illustrates the pattern. Canadian chemical firms recognized as long ago as 1983 that risks in the handling of hazardous waste in foreign operations can affect reputation and profitability of their worldwide organizations. To address these risks, a group of chemical companies led by Dow Canada and the Canadian Chemical Producers Association (CCPA), with encouragement from the Canadian government, agreed to develop a set of safe operating principles. The 1984 explosion of a Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, accelerated the development and adoption of these principles, which came to be called the Responsible Care Initiative (RCI), as other chemical companies joined the initiative in an effort to improve the industry’s reputation.

The initiative originally included six standards for safe practice in chemical production, transport, and control. Although the standards had been adopted by numerous chemical companies by 1988, by 1993, chemical firms were learning, as Responsible Care Vice President Brian Wastle explained to us, that the mere fact that “CEOs stated they had met their commitment meant nothing to an untrusting public.” So, the standards were expanded to include a provision for verification and ongoing improvement of performance. Wastle reports that the standards now require that “teams of industry experts, public advocates and local citizens” review each company every four years.

The ultimate test of Responsible Care is whether it delivers improved performance. On an ongoing basis, CCPA member companies must track, improve and report to their publics how they are performing in all the aspects of health, safety, environmental and social performance that are important to those publics. CCPA collects, collates and publishes data from all companies that our critics have told us they are particularly interested in. These include chemical emissions and wastes, with five-year projections, employee injuries and illnesses, chemical process spills and fires and transportation accidents.

51. The six categories of the original standards included the following: (1) community awareness and emergency response, (2) research and development, (3) manufacturing, (4) transportation, (5) distribution, and (6) hazardous waste management. See Canada’s Chemical Producers, About Responsible Care, http://www.ccpa.ca/ResponsibleCare/ (last visited Nov. 6, 2007) [hereinafter Responsible Care Initiative].
52. Chemical companies that were part of the original Responsible Care Initiative include Dow Chemical Canada, Imperial Chemical Industries subsidiary Canadian Industries, Ltd., Union Carbide Canada, Imperial Oil Chemicals, H.L. Blachford, Rhone-Poulenc Canada, Ethyl Canada, Rohm & Haas Canada, Hoescht Celanese, General Chemical, Allied Chemicals, Shell (chemical division), Cyanamide Canada, and Polysar. E-mail from Brian Wastle, Vice President, Responsible Care®, to Cynthia Williams, Osler Chair in Business Law, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University (Feb. 6, 2008) (on file with authors). Responsible Care® is a registered trademark of the Canadian Chemical Producers’ Association (CCPA).
53. Id.
54. Id. Under the heading “Other Aspects of Responsible Care,” the Responsible Care code now includes the following:

Responsibility Care Initiative, supra note 51.
three years, and “write a consensus report summarizing the verification process and players, opportunities for improvement, findings, required corrective action and successful practices,” with verification certificates awarded once the work is completed.55

Similarly, firms that use highly labor-intensive manufacturing and assembly processes, such as apparel and toy manufacturers, have responded to media attacks on firms whose products were allegedly made in sweatshop conditions56 by developing codes of practice for their own factories and for supplier factories. But these firms have also learned that announcing codes of practice is not sufficient to solve the problem57—they must also develop implementation strategies and arrange for inspection and certification to be sure the codes are in fact implemented.

To enhance brand protection by tackling the implementation problem in one industry, for example, a group of corporations in the apparel and “sewn products” industries, together with industry trade associations,58 provided seed money and technical support to form a third party standard-setting organization called WRAP (Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production) in the late 1990s, with the goal of establishing worker safety and human rights performance standards to be applied at the factory level, and implementing inspection and certification procedures.59 WRAP is now formally an

55. E-mail from Brian Wastle, supra note 52.


57. Wal-Mart has posted ten Guiding Ethical Principles on its website, and states that it periodically inspects its factories for implementation; yet Wal-Mart continues to come under fire for tolerating poor working conditions in supplier factories. See, e.g., Konzelmann et al., supra note 47, at 21-22 (reporting on studies of Wal-Mart’s labor practices, state-level sanctions for “repeated violation[s] of child safety ordinances, wage and hour regulations [and] anti-discrimination mandates,” and lawsuits alleging wide-spread practice of forced “off-the-clock” work); see also Brooksbank, supra note 46 (expressing the Norwegian Government Pension Fund’s view that continued investment in Wal-Mart would “contribute to serious or systematic violations of human rights”); Steven Greenhouse & Michael Barbaro, An Ugly Side of Free Trade: Sweatshops in Jordan, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2006, at C1 (reporting on a study by the National Labor Committee finding substandard conditions and abuse of employees at more than 25 out of 100 apparel factories in Jordan, including factories that supply Wal-Mart and Jones Apparel). Immediately after the National Labor Committee study findings were released, Democrats in Congress pledged to introduce legislation to prohibit import or sale of goods made under conditions that violate core International Labor Organization worker rights standards, illustrating one of the risks global corporations face if they do not successfully enforce adequate labor practices at factories from which they buy products. See Kristi Ellis, House Democrats Ask Bush to Investigate Jordan Abuse, WOMAN’S WEAR DAILY, May 4, 2006, available at http://www.nlclnet.org/article.php?id=38.


59. The first result of the AAMA initiative was the 12 WRAP Principles—standards of labor practices, factory conditions, and environmental and customs compliance. Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production,
independent non-profit organization, governed by a board of directors of which, by the organization’s bylaws, more than half must be unaffiliated with the apparel or other labor-intensive manufacturing industry. Factory certification by WRAP requires that the facilities meet initial standards, as certified by an approved independent monitor, and be subject to unannounced audits and annual renewal.

The awareness of supply chain risks is amplified by recognition on the part of corporations and their investors that a large share of the economic value that firms create is tied to their “brand value.” But, as discussed above, brand value is only as good as its weakest link because expansion in international travel and communications makes it harder for firms to hide their dirty laundry. Wal-Mart, for example, has undertaken a massive public-relations campaign, including drawing attention to its new code of ethics, to attempt to respond to critics who charge that its suppliers violate international labor norms. Although its code notably lacks both specifics about standards of treatment for

Why the WRAP Apparel Certification Program is Special, http://www.wrapapparel.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=26 (last visited Nov. 6, 2007). The AAMA Board of Directors publicly endorsed these principles in 1998. Id. For the next two years, the Association worked with producers, public interest groups, and development agencies to “design a process and develop an organization to monitor and certify factories for compliance—in hundreds of details—with the principles.” Id. The fruit of this work was the incorporation of WRAP in 2000 as a “501 [c] 6” organization. Id.

60. See Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production, About WRAP—Board and Staff, http://www.wrapapparel.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=5 (last visited Nov. 6, 2007). One of us (Blair) has served as an independent board member of WRAP since 2005.

61. The organization is working to obtain commitments from apparel firms and retailers that products that carry certain brands must be made in certified factories. Dara O’Rourke, Multi-stakeholder Regulation: Privatizing or Socializing Global Labor Standards?, 34:5 WORLD DEV. 899, 900 (2006) (describing and comparing six major international programs that provide what the author calls “non-governmental regulation” in the apparel and sewn products industries, including WRAP, Social Accountability International (SA 8000) (discussed below), Fair Labor Association, Ethical Trading Initiative, Fair Wear Foundation, and Worker Rights Consortium).

62. A 1999 study by Stanford economist Robert Hall found that less than one-third of the market value of corporate financial claims in that year could be attributed to the value of physical assets owned by corporations, suggesting that the rest of the value was tied to intangible assets such as brand value. See Robert E. Hall, E-Capital: The Link Between the Stock Market and the Labor Market in the 1990s, in 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 73 (2000).

63. Wal-Mart’s website notes that its “Global Ethics Office” was established in June 2004; on June 4, 2004, according to the website, “Wal-Mart released a revised Global Statement of Ethics to communicate our ethical standards to all Wal-Mart facilities and stakeholders. The Global Ethics Office provides guidance in making ethical decisions based on the Global Statement of Ethics and a process for anonymous reporting of suspected ethics violation . . . .” Wal-Mart, Global Ethics Office, http://www.walmartstores.com/GlobalWMStoresWeb/navigate.do?catg=8 (last visited Nov. 6, 2007). Wal-Mart’s principles are:

Follow the law at all times
Be honest and fair
Never manipulate, misrepresent, abuse or conceal information
Avoid conflicts of interest between work and personal affairs
Never discriminate against anyone
Never act unethically—even if someone else instructs you to do so
Never ask someone to act unethically
Seek assistance if you have questions about the Statement of Ethics or if you face an ethical dilemma
Cooperate with any investigation of a possible ethics violation
Report ethics violations or suspected violations
workers and enforcement mechanisms, Wal-Mart may very well not be the worst offender among U.S. retailers in its tolerance of labor abuses in supplier factories. But because of the high visibility of its brand, it is believed to be very influential in establishing industry norms, and hence may be targeted more intensely by NGOs and other activists than smaller, less well-known firms.

2. The Increasing Sophistication of Activists Pressuring Corporations About Environmental, Human Rights, or Labor Concerns

As corporations find themselves in the glare of the NGO spotlight for their social and environmental practices, a growing number of firms are looking for better ways to make sure they know what is actually happening in their supply chains. Moreover, activists and investors are increasingly asking corporations to provide information about their social performance. This, in turn, has created demand for services of firms that can audit the quality of the non-financial information being produced. For example, some major accounting firms, such as KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers, have recently established global sustainability practice groups with the specialized expertise necessary to attest to environmental and social data.64

The activism of NGOs is accompanied by a proliferation of social and environmental responsibility standards over the past ten years. These initiatives have been developed by states, public/private partnerships, multi-stakeholder negotiation processes, industries and companies, institutional investors, functional groups such as accountancy firms and social assurance consulting groups (many of which did not exist more than about five years ago), NGOs, and non-financial ratings agencies.65

One example (among many) is Social Accountability 8000 ("SA 8000"), a project of Social Accountability International. SA 8000 is an auditable certification standard based on international labor and human rights standards.66 SA 8000 also provides a social

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Id.


66. This standard is a voluntary, universal standard for companies interested in auditing and certifying labor practices in their facilities and those of their suppliers and vendors, based on the principles of international human rights norms as described in International Labour Organisation conventions, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Social Accountability Int’l, Overview of SA 8000, http://www.sa-intl.org/index.cfm?Fuseaction=Page.viewPage&pageId=473 (last
accountability management system to guide firms in implementing standards and to demonstrate ongoing conformance with the standards. In particular, meeting SA 8000 standards requires third party certification of individual production facilities, such as factories or farms, based upon an inspection by SAI-approved inspectors and other third party inspectors. Corporations that seek an SA 8000 stamp of approval must stipulate in written purchase contracts with all suppliers that those suppliers conform to the SA 8000 standards.

In addition to standards for apparel and chemicals, discussed above, a number of other industries have promulgated voluntary corporate social responsibility standards that incorporate third party certification demonstrating that products being sold have been produced, harvested, or extracted according to the required standards. These certifications include conflict-free diamonds, sustainable fisheries and forestry, and fair-trade


68. Id.

69. See Kimberly Process, http://www.kimberlyprocess.com (last visited Nov. 6, 2007). The Kimberly Process is a joint government, international diamond industry, and civil society initiative to ensure that shipments of diamonds are free of “conflict diamonds” that have been sold to support wars in such countries as Angola, Cote d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Sierra Leone. Id. The Kimberly Process Certification Scheme requires participating governments to implement import/export controls and systems to track diamonds from mining through export. Id. (then follow “Background”). Rough diamonds exported with a Kimberly Process Certificate must be in sealed containers, and participating countries must set up systems to ensure that rough diamonds cannot be exported except in sealed containers with Certificates. See id. (then follow “KPCS”). All significant diamond producing and trading centers, with the exception of Liberia, are now operating within the framework of the Kimberley Process. U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE, THE KIMBERLEY PROCESS CERTIFICATION SCHEME: THIRD YEAR REVIEW (2006), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/77156.pdf. Review of implemented systems is delegated to multi-stakeholder teams composed of industry, government, and civil society participants, with results delivered to the Kimberley Process Working Group on Monitoring. Id.

70. See, e.g., Marine Stewardship Council, Certification Process, http://www.msc.org/html/content_465.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2007) (describing procedures for fishery certification). The Marine Stewardship Council is a global non-profit that has created an environmental standard for well-managed fisheries, under which third party certifiers can grant labels that assure fish have been grown in well-managed fisheries or caught according to environmentally sustainable principles. See Marine Stewardship Council, About MSC, http://www.msc.org/html/content_462.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2007). As with many of the certification schemes for products, an important part of the certification is “chain of custody” procedures that attempt to ensure the value of the certified label. Marine Stewardship Council, Chain of Custody, http://www.msc.org/html/content_507.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2007).

71. See Univ. of Minn., Human Rights Library, Forest Stewardship Council: Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/links/fscprinciples.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2007) (describing the forestry certification process). The Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) is an international body composed of industry participants, transnational environmental NGOs, and social justice NGOs, which are strongly influenced by international standard setting processes at the ISO, and which accredit organizations to certify that timber and forest products have met the FSC standard for sustainable forest management. See Errol Meidinger, The Administrative Law of Global Private-Public Regulation: The Case of Forestry, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 47, 51 (2006) (analyzing the competition between forestry certification regimes and implications for global governance). The FSC accredits certifying organizations, and there are currently 15 accredited certification organizations. See id. at 74 (citing Forest Stewardship Council,
goods such as coffee, tea, cocoa, and cotton. 72 Thousands of individual companies have adopted voluntary codes of conduct establishing standards for responsible business behavior, and some companies then engage third party certifiers to ensure that their suppliers and subsidiaries are meeting those codes. 73 The development of codes and standards and the increasing expectation that global firms take responsibility for implementing and enforcing these standards throughout their supply chains have greatly expanded the role of third party assurance in global business, even though demand for quality, speed, timely-delivery, and cost control may have provided the initial impetus for this expansion.

3. The Growing Demands for Transparency in Social Performance Indicators

Institutional investor networks are also asking for improved quality and quantity of information from their portfolio companies. Investors in the United Kingdom have been leaders in this development. In 2002, for example, the Association of British Insurers (ABI), which represents insurers that control 17% of stocks listed in the United Kingdom, issued its Disclosure Guidelines on Social Responsibility. 74 In those guidelines, which it updated in 2005 and 2007, 75 the ABI stated that it expects portfolio companies to provide information on an annual basis about how boards of directors evaluate and address environmental, social, and governance risks in the context of the entire range of risks and opportunities facing the company. 76

Climate change has become a particularly salient environmental risk that U.K. investor networks target in their disclosure requests. One example is the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP), a process by a group now comprised of 284 British, European, and American institutional investors, with $41 trillion under management. 77 The CDP elicits information on an annual basis from companies worldwide about the financial risks to the companies from the physical effects of climate change or from regulatory efforts to mitigate those physical changes, and about company actions to manage and


73. The University of Minnesota Law School, under the leadership of international human rights scholar Professor David Weissbrodt, has an extensive collection of human rights materials online, including copies of hundreds of firms’ codes of conduct. See Univ. of Minn., Human Rights Library, http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/business/sicc.html (providing links to these codes).


76. See id. (explaining that the guidelines require companies to provide information on a variety of areas).

reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In 2007, CDP sought information from 2400 of the world’s largest quoted companies (by market capitalization), expanding its requests beyond the Global 500 to include the largest companies in various developed and rapidly developing markets, as well as the largest companies in transport and utilities. These pressures from institutional investors in the United Kingdom and Europe have been an important impetus for new requirements in those jurisdictions for companies to discuss future risks to their businesses from social, environmental, and community matters in their annual reports.

At the same time, firms and investors increasingly recognize that traditional financial measures fail to capture the value within companies from such intangible factors as employees’ knowledge, training, and development. The recognition that such factors are important is driving a search by corporations, consultants, auditors, and institutional investors for auditable non-financial metrics that can be used to measure and report on company performance in developing and protecting important intangible assets such as employee capabilities, brand, and reputation.

The pressure on companies to collect and disclose more relevant non-financial information has been accompanied by pressure to subject their approach to assembling such data to third party review. In 2005, 52% of Global 250 companies issued non-financial sustainability reports, including social, environmental, and economic data, and of these, 30% included independent third party assurance of the quality and accuracy of the underlying data. Major accounting firms currently dominate the non-financial assurance and attestation market, issuing attestation statements for nearly 60% of independently verified sustainability reports.

Two global standards are under development for the assurance of non-financial information:

78. Id. In 2004, 70% of the Global 500 firms provided information that Innovest analyzed. Innovest is a specialized investment research and advisement firm that analyzes firm-specific risk from social, environmental, and strategic governance issues. Innovest Strategic Value Advisors, http://www.innovestgroup.com (last visited Nov. 27, 2007).

79. As of 2005, companies in Europe were required to include “a fair review of the development and performance of the company’s business and of its position, together with a description of the principal risks and uncertainties that it faces.” Council Directive 2003/51, 2003 O.J. (L 178) 18. In addition, “to the extent necessary for an understanding of the company’s development, performance or position, the analysis shall include both financial and, where appropriate, nonfinancial key performance indicators relevant to the particular business, including information relating to environmental and employee matters.” Id. For a further discussion of these requirements, see Williams & Conley, An Emerging Third Way?, supra note 65, at 509-10.


82. Id. at 5, 30.

83. See id. at 5. “Auditing” follows procedural rules recognized by the profession for examining financial statements. “Attestation” refers to other types of third party verification statements.
reports. In March 2003, the U.K.-based AccountAbility organization issued AA 1000AS, which focuses on evaluating the materiality, completeness, and responsiveness of a company’s reporting to its various stakeholder groups.84 In December 2003, the International Federation of Accountants’ (IFAC) International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board (IAASB), which is the global professional organization for accountants, issued guidance for accounting firms’ assurance work for non-financial reports.85 This standard is applicable to any assurance work by accountants after January 1, 2005, and was necessary, according to the IFAC, to meet the increasing demand for assurance reports on “[e]nvironmental, social and sustainability reports, information systems, internal control, corporate governance processes and compliance with grant conditions, contracts and regulations.”86

IV. An Examination of These Developments: China as a Case Study

In both the short run, and possibly in the long run, the developments surveyed above point toward a rapidly developing shift in the sources of regulatory authority towards private standard setting87 and private enforcement through inspection, monitoring, and certification services by third party assurance service organizations. The increasing reliance by global corporations on third party assurance services in lieu of either direct control of production in facilities owned by the corporations, or court enforcement of contracts entered into with locally owned businesses, raises questions about how corporations may be influencing the development of law and legal institutions in developing countries. It seems possible, for example, that when industries and civil society bypass government to develop standards and private mechanisms of enforcement, they implicitly demonstrate the benefits to a society from having clear legal rules and sophisticated, independent courts to enforce them. This may help foster an interest on the part of middle class entrepreneurs and business people in rule of law institutions, thereby hastening establishment of such institutions in developing countries.

Business people under pressure to meet numerous different codes and standards may also begin to support regulation and enforcement by local governments to avoid multiple inspections, fees, and possibly conflicting standards. Moreover, once some businesses are required to meet higher standards, they often find that it is in their interest that the same regulatory requirements be imposed on their competitors. For these reasons we might expect that widespread use of third party assurance services to help implement business norms and enforce contracts will hasten the movement toward rule of law.


86. See id.

On the other hand, to the extent that private-sector arrangements provide a satisfactory substitute for government-provided local legal institutions, they may take pressure off governments to build independent uncorrupted legal institutions, and thereby slow down the movement toward rule of law. For example, some critics of efforts by NGOs to act as watchdogs in enforcing agreements about labor protections in factories have argued that local governments are “ceding some of their sovereignty to consumers” and that NGOs may thereby “ultimately undermine traditional regulatory processes.”

Whether we observe either outcome is likely to vary from country to country. It may also vary as between enforcing contract terms having to do with quality and timely delivery, versus enforcing terms established to meet social performance expectations.

We do not have clear answers to these questions yet, but a telling case is the current debate among Chinese factory owners, their corporate customers from developed countries, human rights and labor advocates, and Chinese government officials about whether Chinese firms should accept standards imposed on them by outsiders and submit to private third party inspectors to ensure those standards are met. China’s case is interesting because the emergence of a network of firms attempting to do inspection and certification work in China was initially driven by the demand by developed country apparel firms and retailers that supplier firms in China meet social standards, especially for workplace safety and fair labor practices. But it is now rapidly spreading to other industries, and, more importantly, the Chinese appear to be trying to take responsibility themselves for creating social standards and for certifying that factories meet those standards.

The story of China’s amazing rush to industrialize and compete in the global economy in the last two decades is now fairly well known. China began opening its markets and encouraging production of goods for foreign markets in the 1980s, and by the mid- to late-1990s had become one of the world’s largest suppliers of textile and apparel products, toys, and other labor-intensive, relatively low-technology products. Early on in this process, little attention was paid either by Chinese factory managers or by their global customers to how such products were made. Buyers were focused mainly on

88. O’Rourke, supra note 61, at 907.

89. The latter may also be imposed on local firm suppliers through compliance clauses in contracts with global customers or creditors. See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenberg, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913 (2007) (examining how private contracting regulates behavior of firms in supply chains).

90. See infra notes 117-125 and accompanying text.

91. China was also rapidly becoming a supplier of more technologically-intensive products, but apparel products and toys were the first industries where global corporations began trying to impose social responsibility requirements on the Chinese suppliers. See, e.g., Gary Gereffi, International Trade and Industrial Upgrading in the Apparel Commodity Chain, 48:1 J. INT’L ECON. 37, 50 (1999) (tabulating the trend in U.S. apparel imports by country from 1983 to 1997, where China had become the largest exporter to the United States in 1993); see also Contemporary China Research Center of Tsinghua University, Shencheng shouye de yixiang yu zhongguo shehui de yingxiang – yi xiang shizheng yanjiu de baogao [The Impact of the Movement of Codes of Conduct on the Chinese Society – An Empirical Study], in KUAGUO GONGSI DE SHEHUI ZEREN YU ZHONGGUO SHEHUI [SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF TRANATIONAL CORPORATIONS & THE CHINESE SOCIETY] 35-38 (Tan Shen & Liu Kaiming eds., 2003) [hereinafter Empirical Study] (finding that in a sample of 200 companies, 55 companies reported CSR inspections by global buyers; the earliest inspection reported was conducted in 1995; the companies that reported CSR inspections were mostly in labor intensive industries such as apparel, footwear, toys and sports goods).
price, delivery speed, quality, and reliability. These are factors that buyers can observe for themselves with simple goods, such as apparel and toys, and they consequently did not worry about the conditions under which the products were being made.

By the early 1990s, however, the international press began writing stories about the appalling conditions in factories where branded products were made. By 1995 and 1996, a few high-visibility corporations, including Nike, The Gap, and Kathy Lee Gifford’s apparel line for Wal-Mart, were targeted relentlessly by news reports and social activists for operating sweatshops in developing countries. In response, some firms adopted their own codes of practice for their vendors. But that didn’t end the drumbeat of bad publicity, so the industry began working with NGOs, labor organizations, and other groups to develop codes of best practice and to figure out how to get their supplier firms to implement them. (See discussion above in Part III.D). The SA 8000 standards were among the first of such codes. Since 2000, numerous international companies that have Chinese factories in their supply chains have been attempting to require that the Chinese factories meet a variety of social responsibility standards, including SA 8000, WRAP, and ICTII (toy manufacturers), and some codes developed internally by certain large buyers.

Just telling factories that they must meet certain standards does not make it happen in practice, however. The mechanism that global customers have used to pressure supplier factories to meet standards is the requirement in their contracts with Chinese companies that the factories be inspected and certified either by inspectors from the buyer


94. This code was actually developed by the Council on Economic Priorities Accreditation Association (CEPAA) in 1997, but CEPAA changed its name to Social Accountability International (SAI) in 2000, and the code has since been called SA 8000. See Social Accountability Int’l, supra note 66.

95. One article in a Chinese publication estimates that 80% of the 95 surveyed export factories in southeast China have experienced various forms of factory inspection demanded by their western clients. Shenzhen Ni Tui Xing Qi Ye She Hui Ze Ren Ren Zheng [Shenzhen Is Planning To Carry Out CSR Certification], http://www.yfzs.gov.cn/gb/info/wtoyfz/LTXX/2005-10/04/1137250995.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2007). But this does not mean that these factories have all been subject to third party inspection and certification. As the Chinese suppliers reported in other surveys, many buyers conduct some kind of social inspections either by themselves or through independent auditors. As of September 30, 2005, only 106 Chinese companies had obtained SA 8000 certification, while a survey conducted by researchers at Tsinghua University and supported by the Ford Foundation revealed that as of 2002 at least 8000 factories in the coastal area had been subject to some kind of social inspections by their buyers. See Empirical Study, supra note 91, at 19 (the finding was based on a field study begun in 2001). This suggests that many social inspections are not formal third party inspections.

96. Levi-Strauss, Reebok, Wal-Mart, and The Gap have all had vendor codes of conduct since the early 1990s, see sources listed in supra note 93; yet adopting the codes and implementing them are different things.
corporation, or by third party inspectors and certifiers. 97

The initial reaction of Chinese manufacturing companies (as well as some Chinese scholars, policy analysts, and business people) to customer pressures to meet social standards, such as SA 8000, was surprise, hostility to the standards, and panic because meeting the standards would require higher costs and make it more difficult, factory owners believed, for Chinese firms to win contracts with big buyers. 98 Some went so far as to charge that the requirement was a new form of non-tariff barrier, 99 a protectionist measure designed to “undercut competitiveness of developing countries.” 100 For reasons that aren’t entirely clear, the SA 8000 certification program has been the most controversial. In the last few years, in fact, it has become a lightning rod for widespread resentment and distrust among owners and operators of Chinese facilities asked to meet the standards by their big-name global customers.

Chinese critics of social responsibility standards have further challenged the purpose of the SA 8000 requirements on the grounds that few facilities in developed countries have been required to meet SA 8000 standards, and that, while SA 8000 requires that certified facilities must protect freedom of association, the rate of unionization in the United States, where SA 8000 standards were developed, is very low. 101 Critics have also expressed resentment about meeting SA 8000 requirements because the SA 8000 process is costly, often requiring that fees be paid to certification bodies not only for the certification itself, but also for consulting assistance required to meet the standards. It is widely believed in China that the high consulting fees are products of the unregulated


100. Zhongguo zuo hao zhun bei ying tiao zhan [China Gets Ready to Take Challenges], PEOPLE DAILY [sic], Oct. 22, 2004 (reporting that the United States, European Union, and Japan will continue to use technical trade barriers, intellectual property rights, and SA 8000 to increase the China textile production costs and curtail China’s competitiveness); Fa da guo jia wu qiang tui zing SA 8000 biao zhun ren zheng [Developed Countries Want to Impose the SA 8000 Certification], MARKET POST, May 14, 2004; Zhen zheng de kao yian dao le [The Real Challenge Comes], PEOPLE DAILY (Overseas edition), Jan. 2, 2004 (asserting that SA 8000 is a non-tariff trade barrier).

certification markets.102 Moreover, the unwillingness of buyer corporations to absorb the additional cost of meeting social standards, plus lack of training and unprofessional behavior by auditors for the certifying firms, have led Chinese firms to believe that the certification process is not taken seriously by buyer firms. Chinese firms believe that, in practice, certification is more or less an extortion scheme, in which certifying organizations will certify manufacturing facilities that adequately pay off the certifier.103 Not surprisingly, some Chinese suppliers have found ways to falsify their records and satisfy the auditors with superficial changes.104

Participants in the debate over SA 8000 in China have also charged that, while imposition of social accountability standards by multinational companies may please the customers of those companies, this amounts to “value imperialism” by western society.105 They note that factories that supply products for China’s domestic market are not required to meet similar standards. The reality behind this complaint, however, is more complicated. China’s own labor protection laws are in fact very similar to the requirements of SA 8000, though, in practice, they are typically not enforced for lack of resources and other factors.106 By contrast, multinational firms with the help of the inspection/certification firms, can enforce the SA 8000 requirements by threatening to
cancel orders if plants fail to meet standards as reported by the certifying firms. This suggests that the multinational corporations insisting on third party inspection to enforce social norms in Chinese factories are, in fact, merely implementing standards that China’s own leaders have articulated in Chinese law.

Moreover, recent developments in China suggest that resistance to the social performance standards implied by SA 8000 and other internationally imposed standards may be softening and that China may even be moving to embrace and implement such standards on its own. One surprising development is the fact that job growth in the industrial regions of China has actually exceeded the pace at which potential workers are flowing into these regions from rural areas, creating some actual shortages of skilled or experienced labor in some areas. The shortages are blamed in part on “low wages and poor working conditions,” but may also be due to migration policies in China designed to slow the movement of people out of the countryside into the urban industrial centers.

The second development is the growing unrest in China over the widening gap between rich and poor, between interior areas and coastal regions, as well as between urban and rural regions, and the dissatisfaction of lower income groups over low pay and the appalling standards at factories that serve only domestic markets. These two factors have led China’s own working classes and intellectual elite to begin demanding that factories that serve only the domestic market should also be required to meet higher standards for safety and worker protection.

In response to these problems, there has been a subtle change in attitude toward “corporate social responsibility” standards among scholars, officials, and the general public in China. For example, derogatory words such as “stick” (Da Bang), and “non-tariff barrier” are being used less frequently. Moreover, the Chinese central
government has explicitly endorsed a number of goals related to corporate social responsibility. In its Five Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development of the People’s Republic of China, adopted in March 2006 by the National People’s Congress, two of the twelve national priorities listed in the Plan related directly to improving the standards of social responsibility to which Chinese firms are held. These priorities are “building a harmonious socialist society,” and “building a resource-conserving and environment-friendly society.” It has become widely accepted among scholars and officials that the implementation of socially responsible norms by business is an integral part of what the phrase building a “harmonious socialist society” means.

China embracing the idea of requiring socially responsible behavior by business firms, however, may not in the long run translate into more business for western inspection and certification services. Since mid-2006, the Chinese government in Beijing has authorized the Ministry of Commerce to work with seven other Chinese agencies to develop “corporate social responsibility” standards, and the China National Textile and Apparel Council has created the Committee for the Promotion of Corporate Social Accountability System for Chinese Textile Enterprises. This set of standards has been given the title “CSC9000T” (in obvious imitation of the “ISO 9000” and “SA 8000” models), and bears a strong resemblance to standards developed by WRAP and SAI.


III. Principal Tasks and Measures for Economic and Social Development in 2006 . . .

10. We will conscientiously work to resolve problems that affect the vital interests of the people and pay very close attention to safeguarding social stability. We will promote the building of a harmonious society, focusing on increasing employment, improving the social security system, distributing wealth more equitably and safeguarding social stability. (1) We will continue to follow a vigorous employment policy. . . . (2) We will speed up development of the social security system. . . . (3) We will make appropriate adjustments in income distribution. . . . (4) We will help needy urban and rural residents in their work and lives. . . . (5) We will further strengthen production safety management. . . . (6) We will safeguard and promote social stability. . . .

Id.


for apparel and textile manufacturing facilities. CSC9000T is defined as “industry specific management system for social compliance for China’s textile and apparel sector, which is based upon the Chinese laws and regulations and relevant international conventions as well as in line with the Chinese characteristics.” A special committee, the Responsible Supply Chain Association, has been established by the China National Textile and Apparel Council (CNTAC) to promote the implementation of CSC9000T.

Both the English and Chinese versions of the CSC9000T website make clear, though, that “[t]he CSC9000T is not intended for the purpose of audit and certification.” Instead of following the certification model developed in western countries, CSC9000T invents a so-called “third party evaluation model” structured with Chinese characteristics. CSC9000T is described as a management model based on a “Plan-Do-Check-Act” system. “Check” means evaluating systems of production, identifying problems, and finding solutions. Third party evaluation organizations aid the process. The evaluation reports by the third party organizations are subject to final approval by the Responsible Supply Chain Association (RSCA), a group of companies doing business in China with a commitment to CSC9000T. Firms then develop plans to address problems identified in the evaluation, and their efforts to implement these plans will eventually be rated by the third party evaluation organization. The ratings are either “defensive,” “compliant,” “managerial,” “strategic,” or “civil.” CSC9000T claims that these ratings are basically the five stages of constructing corporate social responsibility. The evaluation reports and ratings will not be available to the public, however. According to the CSC9000T Principles, a firm can demonstrate its compliance with the CSC Principles to its stakeholders, buyers, or other third parties by voluntarily disclosing the results of the evaluation, but that is not a required part of the process.

RSCA is, in principle, responsible for ensuring the independence of the so-called “third party evaluation organizations” by evaluating the capacity of the organizations, the training of evaluators, the monitoring of the evaluation process conducted by the third party evaluation organizations, and the handling of disputes over ratings and reports. Currently there are 168 members of RSCA, including state-owned enterprises, joint ventures, wholly foreign enterprises, and Chinese firms, although most are domestic Chinese firms. There are two non-Chinese domestic companies—Hudson’s Bay Company, a large department store group in Canada, and Linmark Group, a Hong-Kong Based retail services provider—that have endorsed CSC9000T by being cooperative.

123. Id.
partners with RSCA.  

Substantively, CSC9000T is more like ISO 14000 than SA 8000 in terms of its underlying philosophy. That is, the standards set forth in the CSC9000T are long-term goals or commitments rather than immediately applicable substantive standards. CSC9000T is a management tool to help a firm manage its social responsibility risk, as well as improve its performance, rather than a standard by which to certify performance. The function of the CSC9000T is said to be to promote continual improvement in labor protection, without an explicit substantive end-point that has been defined. Procedurally, CSC9000T provides for “third party evaluation organizations,” but these organizations’ functions are limited and their independence is questionable. RSCA controls the process, from deciding the eligibility of evaluating organizations and monitoring the process of evaluations to approving the actual reports that the evaluators generate. Since the members of the RSCA are the same firms that are subject to CSC9000T evaluation—Chinese domestic companies—there is the obvious potential for conflicts of interest, and for the process to be used to promote the appearance but not the reality of improving labor and other social conditions. Moreover, since the evaluation reports and ratings will not be available to the public, the pressure from buyers in the supply chain may still be the only mechanism for ensuring that these firms actually improve their labor standards. And, so far as we can tell, there are no global customers accepting CSC9000T evaluations instead of certification to SA 8000, or WRAP, or to the customers’ codes of conduct.

What effect CSC9000T will have on the development of law and norms in China is not yet known, of course, and it is too soon to be entirely confident about its likely effect. While CSC9000T does not, in principle, have the force of law, it may nonetheless be useful in helping local government officials develop the capacity to evaluate manufacturing facilities. To the extent that CSC9000T embodies the existing requirements of Chinese law, it would be appropriate for local governments to develop this capability. In fact, local government officials might well view the development of CSC9000T by the quasi-official National Textile and Apparel Council as encouragement from China’s central government for local government officials to be more proactive in enforcing existing law. To the extent that such evaluations generate income (from inspection fees, for example, or perhaps from fines for violations of legal codes), local governments may have a financial incentive to become more proactive in enforcing labor law as written.

V. THEORETICAL AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

This Article bridges two previously distinct fields of law; one that has to do with the institutions and mechanisms by which private contracts are drafted and enforced, and the other that has to do with how corporate behavior is policed, especially in the international arena.
A. The Contractual Role of Third Party Assurance

On the contract side, the role being played by third party assurance in global commerce can be understood as a mechanism for solving a number of common contracting problems. First, we can think of the relationship between a manufacturing firm in a developing country and a global corporation that contracts to buy the output of the manufacturer as an “agency” relationship, in which the manufacturer makes specialized goods on behalf of the global corporation. In any agency relationship we would expect to find problems arising from “asymmetric information” (the agent has knowledge about his performance that the principal does not have) and from “misalignment of incentives” (the agent doesn’t always have an incentive to perform in a way that is in the principal’s best interest).

Employing third party assurance services addresses both problems by monitoring the agent’s activities on behalf of the principal. On one hand, using a third party assurance service might increase agency costs by engaging yet another agent—with all the associated information asymmetry and incentive problems. On the other, the third party assurance organization may in many instances have several monitoring advantages relative to the cost of the principal of either doing its own monitoring or simply living with the discrepancy between what the global corporation wants and what the manufacturing firm actually does. Relying on the assurance firm may also save costs for the principal because assurance firms specialize in monitoring certain kinds of problems, and thereby bring certain expertise to bear in gathering and interpreting the necessary information.

Second, contracts between a global corporation and a developing country supplier may inevitably be incomplete in some ways. In parts of the world where legal systems are well developed, contracting parties can get access to courts if they disagree about some aspect of the relationship, and courts can generally be trusted to decide the dispute by imputing terms that may be missing in the formal contract. If both parties to the contract regard courts as neutral, independent, and reasonably sophisticated, the parties are likely to be comfortable with this approach to dispute resolution. But where contracting parties do not have a high level of confidence in courts of law, we might expect to find alternative arrangements that involve appeals to neutral, but sophisticated, third parties such as arbitrators and assurance firms. Recognizing this issue, China, for example, established a quasi-governmental organization, the China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), whose roots go back to the 1950s, for the purpose of arbitrating disputes between Chinese firms and foreign companies doing business in China. Third party assurance organizations of the type we are considering in this Article do not handle complex contract disputes, but they may be able to resolve relatively simple questions about contractual performance, such as

126. For an overview of the literature on agency problems within contracts, see, e.g., Oliver Hart & Bengt Holmström, The Theory of Contracts, in ADVANCES IN ECONOMIC THEORY: FIFTH WORLD CONGRESS 88 (Truman F. Bewley ed., 1987).

127. We will not even attempt to summarize that work here, and will certainly not cite all of the scholarship on the subject. But see id., for a useful discussion of the implications of incomplete contracts. See also MILGROM & ROBERTS, supra note 8, at 133, for a brief and accessible introduction to the economic theories of incomplete contracts.
whether the manufacturing contractor maintains a “safe” workplace and does not employ child labor.

Third, it is a well-understood phenomenon in contract theory that performance problems in contractual relationships can be substantially reduced if both parties to the contract have reputational capital at risk in the relationship. Parties that have a reputation for honesty, competence, and fair-dealing can reduce contracting costs because their contractual partners know that the advantages of cheating in a particular relationship are likely to be more than offset by the costs to the firm from reputational damage. In the relationship between a large globally-recognized corporation and a local manufacturing firm in a developing country, the global company is likely to have more reputational capital at stake to constrain its behavior and bond its commitments, at least initially. The supplier firm may have strong incentives to develop a reputation as an honest and reliable trading partner over time, but may initially need to expend resources to build that reputation. Third party assurance services may facilitate that process by acting as reputational intermediaries. This may work because the assurance firm has little in the way of assets except its reputation, and it has no direct stake in the outcome of any evaluation it performs. It may therefore be more credible in how it evaluates the supplier firm’s performance.

In recent years, economists and legal scholars interested in economic development have begun focusing on another type of contractual problem, which arises when the legal system is weak, corrupt, or unsophisticated, so that the contracting parties cannot count on courts and officers of the law for fair and independent adjudication and enforcement of contracts. Such circumstances are common in many developing countries, and a growing literature argues that the resulting lack of reliable property or contract enforcement may be a major factor impeding economic development. In such situations, the parties may be able to anticipate and specify in fairly fine detail who does what under what circumstances, but that may be of small comfort if there is no authority available who can enforce the terms.

One might expect that the same institutional arrangements that make a contract “self-enforcing” might also be used extensively to govern business relationships when enforcement authorities are weak, corrupt, or unsophisticated. An alternative, however, might be for the contracting parties to develop systems of private contract enforcement, such as agreements to rely on the assessments of third party inspectors and verifiers for a determination of whether contract terms were satisfied. It appears to us that this is what is happening now in many contexts around the world. In the interaction between global corporations and local firms in developing countries, the parties may, in effect, be importing resources for private law enforcement to interpret contract terms and determine whether they have been met.

Third party assurance firms may thus supply certain contract facilitating and enforcing functions in developing countries that might be supplied by formal legal

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128. See, e.g., Michael Trebilcock & Jing Leng, The Role of Formal Contract Law and Enforcement in Economic Development, 92 Va. L. Rev. 1517, 1537 (2006) (stating that “social pressure and reputation are more widely used than formal contracts and judicial enforcement in executing mutually beneficial agreements”).

institutions in developed countries. In performing these functions, the assurance service can perhaps be understood as importing “rule of law” procedural norms into countries where legal institutions are weak.

B. The Regulatory Role of Third Party Assurance

On the question of how the behavior of global corporations is to be regulated and policed, the phenomenon of third party assurance can be examined in light of so-called “new governance” theories,130 or “global administrative law” theories,131 which have been exploring the role of private actors in public “law-making.” These theories recognize that today we observe an accelerating diffusion of regulatory power among networks of state and non-state actors that transcend national boundaries.132 A central premise of these theories is that in the global economy, “regulatory governance function[s] in a manner not dependent on state law or [in] which state law is not central,” and that there is “a loosening of the sharp distinction between states and markets and between the public and the private.”133 Thus, transnational regulation is now understood to encompass:

regulation-by-non-regulation (laissez faire), through formal self-regulation (such as by some industry associations), hybrid private-private regulation (for example, business-NGO partnerships in the Fair Labor Association), hybrid public-private regulation (for instance, in mutual recognition arrangements where a private agency in one country tests products to certify compliance with governmental standards of another country), network governance by state officials (as in the work of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) on environmental policies to be followed by national export credit agencies), inter-governmental organizations with significant but indirect regulatory powers (for example, regulation of ozone depleting

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131. See Kingsbury et al., supra note 7 (introducing the concept of “global administrative law”).

132. It can be argued that self-regulatory, private initiatives within various industries are hardly new developments either. One can think of guilds or lex mercatoria regimes in the Middle Ages in Europe as historical examples of such self-regulation. This may simply indicate that law scholars have generally tended to define the term “regulation” too narrowly, and that focusing attention on the “new” regulatory regimes engendered by economic globalization has led many scholars to more clearly recognize the regulatory implications of private action—implications available for more systematic observation previously, but which are only now receiving sustained academic attention. See Orly Lobel, The Paradox of Extralegal Activism: Critical Legal Consciousness and Transformative Politics, 120 HARV. L. REV. 937, 978-79 (2007) (asserting that “[t]oday, the lines between private and public functions are increasingly blurred,” but that legal scholars often too sharply emphasize the distinction between regulatory and deregulatory regimes).

133. Scott, supra note 130, at 2-3.
substances under the Montreal Protocol), and inter-governmental organizations with direct governance powers (as with determinations by the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees of individuals’ refugee status, or the WTO dispute resolution system for trade conflicts).134

The phenomenon we study in this Article points to an emerging alternative mechanism of regulation that is tied to private contractual relationships. As we noted above, global, branded companies are exposed to ever greater risks as their supply chains lengthen, as production is moved outside of the firm, and as companies increasingly come under pressure to demonstrate that the conditions of production in their supply chains meet international standards. Given these pressures, companies are including “regulatory” standards for health, safety, conditions of employment, and environmental management in their supply-chain contracts.135 Then the companies engage various certifying organizations to provide assurance that the standards have been met. Thus, the role played by third party assurance may be a merging of private law contractual mechanisms for organizing production with public law activities of standard setting and enforcement.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

We have suggested in this Article that a new private sector mechanism is emerging and operating globally that may provide a substitute for law and formal legal structures both in contract enforcement and in policing the social behavior of firms. The third party assurance industry, which initially came to prominence in international commerce in recent years to provide expert evaluations of product qualities for purposes of enforcing private contracts, is now being deployed globally to implement and enforce social standards. In the process, the activities of these organizations may be having the effect of promulgating international business norms and standards of human rights, labor protection, and social responsibility.

Even where local law as written is consistent with such international standards (such as seems to be true at least for labor protection in China), third party assurance provides an enforcement mechanism that would otherwise be lacking in many countries. Moreover, as we have seen in the Chinese case study, importing international standards and private sector enforcers may have the effect of hastening the development of formal legal institutions that have the potential to implement and enforce those standards.

Clearly, this is not the only possible interpretation of these developments. Commercial interests have long established parallel institutions for the arbitration of commercial disputes that do not depend on local judicial systems,136 and do not

134. Kingsbury et al., supra note 7, at 2.
135. Supply contracts are usually confidential and not accessible to the public. Certain companies’ contracts are filed as part of their annual or quarterly securities reports, however, and thus available to the public. Many companies have incorporated regulatory standards into their supply contracts. See, e.g., Tommy Hilfiger Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at Exhibit 10.19 (June 26, 2001); Warnaco Group, Annual Report (Form 10-K), at Exhibit 10.39 (Mar. 18, 2004); Phoenix Footwear Group, Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at Exhibit 10.3 (Nov. 15, 2005); and Global Beverage Solutions, Current Report (Form 8-K) at Exhibit 10.1 (June 7, 2006).
136. See, e.g., Douglass C. North, Institutions, Transaction Costs, and the Rise of Merchant Empires, in
necessarily have any positive effect on those judicial systems. There are divergent views on what effect, if any, these parallel institutions ultimately have on the state systems of dispute resolution.137 Some commentators have even suggested that arbitration of commercial disputes can undermine public law developments by allowing firms to contract around public law, even the laws of developed economies such as the European Union or the United States.138 We recognize the need for further theoretical work to determine what aspects of “rule of law” are more amenable to influence by the developments described in this Article, and the need to test those theories by evaluating in detail the effect that strengthening commercial substitutes for local judicial enforcement has on public judicial and legal establishments.

We want to know more, for example, about the political dynamic that has given rise to, and that is now responding to, third party assurance regimes as enforcers of social standards. It seems likely, for example, that the new Chinese social responsibility standard, CSC9000T, will not replace third party assurance unless foreign buyers treat a CSC9000T evaluation as the substantial equivalent of an audit and certification, to a Western standard or code of conduct, by an independent third party. For the reasons identified above, however, foreign buyers will undoubtedly be cautious about embracing CSC9000T—in significant part because it neither provides public acknowledgement nor credible assurance that suppliers have actually met acceptable social standards for production.

This suggests an interesting Catch-22 for NGOs, activists, business people, and financial institutions who want to see social and political reform in developing countries. The importation of Western standards and third party certification may, in the short run, help to impose norms and rule of law values such as transparency and accountability in developing economies, including China. These standards may require more stringent human rights or labor protections than those offered by the law as enforced, as in China, but may be consistent with the protections some Chinese political reformers and intellectuals advocate. In some enterprises, such as manufacturing of toys, apparel, and sports equipment, for example, it appears to us that the existence of external pressures from foreign buyers has allowed some Chinese citizens a greater degree of freedom to...
advocate for reforms such as expanded labor rights and better human rights protection.\textsuperscript{139}
To the extent that participants in and around Chinese enterprise participate in developing business norms, social assurance standards, and procedures modeled on Western variants, then, they are essentially engaging in a type of political action in a context that is likely to be less threatening to the government than other types of political activity. Such a development may ultimately be a powerful lever for political liberalization in China. And yet, if Western business interests, investors, and NGOs distrust the Chinese corporate responsibility variants and its assurance industry, and so fail to transfer the norm generating and enforcement power to the Chinese assurance industry, the Western interests will be undermining the potential of this commercial development to advance the political liberalization and human rights protections that inspired the Western concerns to begin with.

Of course, it may also be that China’s experience is atypical. While it is certainly the case that the assurance service business has grown dramatically in size and in importance in China in the last decade, it has also become extremely important around the world, from Mexico to India to Thailand and Vietnam, to Turkey and Eastern Europe and South Africa. And, just as in China, the industry seems to be playing both a contract enforcement role and a role in introducing and enforcing social norms and standards wherever it is operating. We are unaware, however, of local governments outside of China that are attempting to create their own regulatory and inspection regimes in response to the activities of the private sector assurance organizations. These are all questions that await further research.

\textsuperscript{139} In interviews of company executives in large retail firms in the United States with responsibility for supply chain management, conducted with Prof. John Conley as part of projects to explore the CSR trend in business, we have heard this point made: that by coming in with their CSR requirements, Western companies give Chinese managers and government officials who want reform a safe rationale to use to argue for such reform, and also a safe venue in which to make the arguments (within commercial relationships). For a description of the research methodology, see Conley & Williams, Engage, Embed and Embellish, supra note 65, at 8 n.49.